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WHAT DOES WEBSTER MEAN?
JAMES Bopp, JR.t AND RICHARD E. COLESONtt
INTRODUCTION
In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,' the Supreme Court set-
tled a tiny fraction of abortion law, but it did so in a way that unset-
tled the greater part of the matter. Some argue that Webster
overruled Roe v. Wade,2 and yet others proclaim that Webster was
merely a funding case with little precedential value for abortion liti-
gation and legislation. Still others predict dire consequences for civil
and contraceptive rights, and the lives of expectant women.
Clearly, the Supreme Court is well on the way to a new constitu-
tional analysis for abortion jurisprudence, but what does Webster
mean? Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes declared that the state of the
law was only a prediction of what a court would decide when con-
fronted with a given set of facts.3 Applying this Legal Realism
insight to analyze predictively4 what five Justices have now said con-
cerning abortion jurisprudence, it is" evident that Roe and its progeny
are de facto overruled.
The result, however, portends none of the dire consequences
promised by abortion proponents. Rather, Webster demonstrates that
the Supreme Court will once again honor the text and histdry of the
Constitution, and at the same time consider the rights and interests
of all human beings, born and unborn.
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2 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3 See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 457 (1897).
4 Even strong Roe supporters like ProfessorJohn A. Robertson acknowledge the
breadth of Webster using this predictive approach. See Robertson, The Future of Early
Abortion, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1989, at 73; Robertson, Gestational Burdens and Fetal Status:
Justifying Roe v. Wade, 13 AM J. L. & MED. 189 (1987) [hereinafter Robertson,
Gestational Burdens].
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I. WEBSTER MEANS THAT ROE V. WADE AND ITS PROGENY ARE DE
FACTO OVERRULED
After Webster, several changes in abortion jurisprudence are
immediately apparent. First, the Court struck down none of Mis-
souri's abortion regulations. This new willingness to uphold state
regulation of abortion is a marked change from the extreme posi-
tions taken by the pro-Roe majority in Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists.5 Second, Justice Blackmun's new role
marks Webster as a watershed case. Blackmun authored the Roe opin-
ion as head of a solid, activist majority. Now, Justice Blackmun is the
dissenter.
The opinions of five Justices suggest other changes in abortion
jurisprudence, but essentially they predictively proclaim: Roe is
dead. The de facto overruling of Roe is evidenced in five fundamen-
tal ways.
A. Five Justices Have Now Declared A Willingness to Reconsider and
Formally Overrule All or a Substantial Portion of Roe v. Wade
Because the Court has not explicitly overturned Roe, there will
be debate at legislative hearings as well as in the courts over the state
of Roe. Some doubters will want the Court to use the precise phrase
"Roe is overruled" before they act, but for the first time since 1973,
the formal, express reconsideration of Roe awaits only the right case.
Four Justices-Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White,
Scalia, and Kennedy-reconsidered Roe, at least in part, in Webster.
Justice O'Connor did not believe Roe to be sufficiently implicated for
5 476 U.S. 747 (1986). Thornburgh was the high-water mark in the Supreme
Court's restriction of state abortion regulations. The case signaled both the
extremes to which the Roe majority would go, and the rapidly eroding support for
Roe. See Bopp & Coleson, The Right to Abortion: Anomalous, Absolute, and Ripe for
Reversal, 3 B.Y.U. J. PuB. L. 181, 211-18 (1989). Chief Justice Burger's dissent
illustrated both of these aspects. In it, he left the majority and called for
reconsidering Roe. After noting Roe's acceptance of the compelling state interests in
maternal health and unborn life, he remarked: "Yet today the Court astonishingly
goes so far as to say that the State may not even require that a woman contemplating
an abortion be provided with accurate medical information concerning the risks
inherent in the medical procedure .... " Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 783 (Burger, CJ.,
dissenting). Pennsylvania enacted its provisions, he added, "on the mistaken
assumption that this Court meant what it said in Roe concerning the 'compelling
interest' of the states .... Id. at 784 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). Burger's defection
reduced the Roe majority further from its seven to two high in Roe to five to four.
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reconsideration in Webster, preferring to avoid a decision on constitu-
tional issues by statutory construction.6
However, Justice O'Connor has already reconsidered Roe her-
self, and called for the Court to do so, in Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health.7 Although she did not believe Webster to be a
proper case for reconsideration, when such a case comes before the
Court she may be expected once again to reconsider Roe.
8
B. The Unduly Burdensome Test Has Become the De Facto Standard of
Review in Abortion Jurisprudence
In Webster, four Justices-Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White, Scalia, and Kennedy-went farther in reconsidering Roe than
did Justice O'Connor, the fifth member of the new working majority.
The result is that Justice O'Connor's views are now the lowest com-
6 Logically, when a plaintiff brings a case on the basis of a right or an analysis
created in a prior case, the prior case is ipso facto sufficiently implicated for
reconsideration because the real issue is what the Constitution, not precedent,
requires. The precedent is the nexus between the Constitution and the case at bar.
As a result, logic and sound adjudication always require the Court to determine
whether the precedent still accurately interprets the Constitution.
Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989), decided just last
term, demonstrates this point. In Patterson, the same working majority that plenarily
decided Webster reconsidered Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). The
majority's action was appropriate because Runyon created the right under which the
Patterson plaintiffs brought their case (Runyon held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981
encompassed private contracts). By the same logic, Webster provided a proper
occasion for reconsidering Roe.
7 462 U.S. 416, 458-59 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In her Akron dissent,
Justice O'Connor reconsidered Roe even though the parties had not asked her to do
so, a fact which she noted. See id. at 452 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Likewise, in
Patterson, no party called for the reconsideration of Runyon in whichJustice O'Connor
joined, a point duly noted by the dissent. See Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2380 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). Thus, Justice O'Connor's intimation in Thornburgh that a party must
ask before reconsideration may occur is inconsistent with positions she has taken
previously.
To the extent Justice O'Connor relied upon her unduly burdensome test in
Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3063, she was directly "implicating" Roe because the Akron
Court held this test unconstitutional under Roe. See Akron, 462 U.S. at 420 n.1.
Therefore, by relying on this test to uphold the Missouri statutes in Webster, Justice
O'Connor overruled Roe itself.
8 Justice O'Connor's individual reconsideration of Roe in Akron and her
commentary in Webster both demonstrate her low threshold for reconsideration. In
Webster, she indicated that if the plaintiffs appealed only the first sentence of the
Missouri viability testing provision, they might have implicated Roe enough for
reconsideration. See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3061 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
This view is readily confirmed by her agreement to reconsideration of Runyon,
discussed supra notes 6-7.
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mon denominator of the majority and, therefore, her views best pre-
dict the current state of abortion law.
In Akron, Justice O'Connor declared the "unduly burdensome"
or "absolute obstacle" standard to be a necessary threshold test
when reviewing abortion regulations.' This inquiry would largely
replace the compelling interest standard of review, except in cases of
absolute obstacle to or "severe limitation" of the abortion right.' 0
The Akron Court, however, specifically addressed this unduly bur-
densome test and rejected it."1 The Court observed that this test
would largely displace the compelling interest test and would allow
numerous abortion regulations which could not withstand the more
stringent standard.' 2 Justice Powell, writing for the Court, observed
that "the dissent does not think that even one of the numerous abor-
tion regulations at issue imposes a sufficient burden on the 'limited'
fundamental right." 3 The Akron Court expressly held that the
unduly burdensome test was in direct derogation of Roe:
In sum, it appears that the dissent would uphold virtually any abor-
tion regulation under a rational-basis test. It also appears that even
where heightened scrutiny is deemed appropriate, the dissent
would uphold virtually any abortion-inhibiting regulation because
of the State's interest in preserving potential human life. This anal-
ysis is wholly incompatible with the existence of the fundamental
right recognized in Roe v. Wade. 14
Because the absolute obstacle test is now the de facto standard
of review, two results are logically compelled. First, Akron is over-
ruled because under the absolute obstacle test Justice O'Connor
would have upheld all of the Akron provisions. Likewise, Thornburgh,
which dealt with abortion regulations less burdensome than Akron's
and whichJustice O'Connor also would have upheld under her abso-
lute obstacle test, is overruled. Second, because the Court held the
absolute obstacle test was in direct derogation of Roe, adopting this
test logically overrules Roe.
9 See Akron, 462 U.S. at 461-66 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
10 See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
' 'See id. at 420 n. 1.
12 See id.
13 Id.
14 Id. (citations omitted). In view of the Akron holding, Justice O'Connor's joint
assertion in Webster that the Missouri statutes were not unduly burdensome and that
neither Roe nor any of its progeny conflicted with this opinion is untenable. By
relying on the unduly burdensome test to uphold statutes she is either derogating
Roe or overruling Akron.
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In Thornburgh, Justice O'Connor set forth the new, reigning anal-
ysis for courts to use when reviewing abortion regulations:
The State has compelling interests in ensuring maternal health and
in protecting potential human life, and these interests exist
throughout pregnancy. Under this Court's fundamental-rights
jurisprudence, judicial scrutiny of state regulation of abortion
should be limited to whether the state law bears a rational relation-
ship to.legitimate purposes such as the advancement of these com-
pelling interests, with heightened scrutiny reserved for instances in
which the State has imposed an undue burden on the abortion
decision. An undue burden will generally be found in situations
involving absolute obstacles or severe limitations on the abortion
decision, not wherever a state regulation may inhibit abortion to
some degree. And if a state law does interfere with the abortion
decision to an extent that is unduly burdensome, so that it becomes
necessary to apply an exacting standard of review, the possibility
remains that the statute will withstand the stricter scrutiny.
1 5
While it remains to be fully developed in subsequent decisions,
the absolute obstacle test would apparently uphold many state abor-
tion regulations that the pro-Roe majority struck down. Among these
are laws structuring the informed consent dialogue between a physi-
cian and abortion patient;16 statutes mandating judicial considera-
tion of paternal rights; laws expanding parental rights when minors
consider abortion; limitations on gender-selective abortions; limita-
tions of abortion for social rather than maternal life or health rea-
sons; and regulation of the mode and standard of care for abortion
to promote survival of aborted children where possible.
C. There Is No General, Fundamental Right to Abortion
Webster also signalled an evaporation of majority support for a
general, fundamental, constitutional right to abortion by rejecting
Justice Blackmun's characterization of a woman's abortion interest as
a "limited fundamental Constitutional right." 17 The three-Justice
Webster plurality demoted the former fundamental right to a liberty
interest under the fourteenth amendment,18 and therefore states
15 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 828 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist,
J.) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
16 These might include requiring explanations and literature on fetal
development, alternatives to abortion, and potential undesired physical and
psychological sequelae.
17 Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3076 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
18 See id. at 3058 (plurality opinion).
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now need only show that their regulatory scheme is rationally related
to a legitimate state purpose. States will easily meet this rational
basis test by asserting their compelling interests in maternal health
and unborn human life.
Similarly, Justice Scalia's call for a plenary overruling of Roe' 
9
logically rejects a fundamental right to abortion, raising the count to
four Justices in this camp.
Justice O'Connor also agrees that there is no general fundamen-
tal right to abortion, a position evident from her advocacy of the
rational basis test as the appropriate standard of review in most abor-
tion cases.2" Where abortion regulations impose an absolute obsta-
cle or a severe limitation to performing abortions, she might find
that a fundamental right exists. At least, she says, she would employ
heightened scrutiny.2 ' Even where she would apply the heightened
scrutiny, Justice O'Connor observes that the compelling interests of
the state might prevail.22
A simple enumeration of these views indicates that a majority of
the Supreme Court no longer believes the Constitution provides a
general, fundamental right to abortion. As a result, they will use a
rational basis test to review abortion legislation.
D. To the Extent Any Abortion Right Is Recognized, The Trimester Scheme
Is Defunct and States Have Compelling Interests in Unborn Life and
Maternal Health Throughout Pregnancy
In Thornburgh2 3 and Akron,2 4 Justice O'Connor attacked the Roe
trimester scheme.25 She wrote in her Thornburgh dissent, "I ...
19 See id. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring).
20 See Akron, 462 U.S. at 453 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
21 See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In Akron, Justice O'Connor wrote: "Even
assuming that there is a fundamental right to terminate pregnancy in some situations,
there is no justification in law or logic for the trimester framework .. ." Id. at 459
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice O'Connor has not explained
the scope of an absolute obstacle or severe limitation test, but she obviously
approved of the regulations struck down in Akron and Thornburgh. The future will tell,
though, whether her notion of absolute obstacles and severe limitations provides
fundamental right protection for only those burdens threatening the life of the
mother, or includes those imposed by the so-called "hard" cases of rape, incest, and
severe fetal deformity, or whether it encompasses burdens of less severity.
22 See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 828 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
23 476 U.S. 747, 828 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
24 462 U.S. 416, 453-61 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
25 In Roe, the Court declared that the states' interest in maternal health becomes
compelling at approximately the end of the first trimester and the states' interest in
"potential" life becomes compelling at viability. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
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remain of the views expressed in my dissent in Akron. The State has
compelling interests in ensuring maternal health and in protecting
potential human life . . . throughout pregnancy." 2 6 In Akron, she
declared that the trimester scheme "cannot be supported as a legiti-
mate or useful framework."-2 7 She also observed in Akron that medi-
cal technology inevitably would push back the point of viability
(toward conception) and move forward (toward term) the line
between first and second trimester (where abortions are statistically
safer for the woman than carrying a pregnancy to term). Because of
this, she declared, "[t]he Roe framework ... is clearly on a collision
course with itself."-
28
Similarly, in Webster, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White
reiterated their long-standing antipathy to the trimester scheme, and
Justice Kennedy joined.2' They reconsidered the trimester scheme
in Webster and effectively overruled that part of Roe. They declared
that state compelling interests in maternal health and unborn life
exist throughout pregnancy.
30
26 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 828 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
27 Akron, 462 U.S. at 454 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
28 Id. at 458 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Recent reports that technological
advancements could push back the age of viability vindicate Justice O'Connor's
position. In Webster, an amicus curiae brief declared, "The point of viability has not
changed significantly since 1973 and such change is not likely to occur in the
foreseeable future." Brief of Amici Curiae 167 Distinguished Scientists and
Physicians, Including I 1 Nobel Laureates, In Support of Appellees at 9, Webster, 109
S. Ct. 3040 (No. 88-605). According to these amici, viability is not possible at less
than about 24 weeks primarily because of immaturity of the lungs, which is "the most
important determinant." Id. at 10. They conclude, "There are no medical
developments anticipated in the foreseeable future that would bring about adequate
fetal lung function prior to 23 to 24 weeks of gestation." Id. at 11. Countering this
pessimistic and myopic view of technological possibilities are recent reports of the
use of oxygenated liquids to allow premature lungs to breath perhaps as early as 20
weeks. See For Babies, 'Liquid Air' May Spare Fragile Lungs, N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1989,
at C3, col. 4.
Justice Blackmun resorted to revisionist history in Webster in attempting to show
that no progress has been made in lowering viability between Roe and Webster. In Roe,
he said that "[v]iability is usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks) but may
occur earlier, even at 24 weeks." Roe, 410 U.S. at 160. In Webster he declared that
"the threshold of fetal viability is, and will remain, no different from what it was at
the time Roe was decided. Predictions to the contrary are pure science fiction."
Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3076 n.12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for a group of
American Law Professors). However, this immovable viability line, trumpeted by
Blackmun and the Amicus Curiae mentioned above, is "23 to 24 weeks," Brief of
Amicus Curiae, supra; Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3075-76 n.9 (Blackmun, J., dissenting),
not the 28 weeks declared "usual" in Roe. Thus, Justice Blackmun's line is
immovable only if seen through the smoke and mirrors of revisionist history.
29 See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3057 (plurality opinion).
30 See id. at 3055.
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BecauseJustice Scalia called for the plenary reversal of Roe in his
Webster concurrence, it is reasonable to assume that he also would
approve dismantling the trimester scheme. 3 To the extent some
fundamental right to abortion continues to enjoy majority support
on the Court, Scalia presumably would recognize the existence of the
two compelling interests throughout pregnancy which the plurality
identified.
Thus, as the trimester scheme no longer enjoys majority support
on the Supreme Court, it may be considered de facto and sub silentio
overruled. The law now recognizes the states' compelling interests
in unborn life and maternal health throughout pregnancy.
E. To the Extent Any Fundamental Abortion Right Is Recognized,
Abortion Regulations Need No Longer Be Narrowly Tailored
Justice O'Connor's rejection of the "narrowly tailored" standard
for reviewing abortion laws is another de facto change in abortion
law. Roe's discussion of the standard of review for fundamental
rights served as the foundation for a two-prong test for constitution-
ally reviewing abortion statutes. First, the state must show a compel-
ling interest supporting the regulation of abortion and, second, the
statute must be narrowly tailored to affect only the compelling
interest.
32
Justice O'Connor, however, wrote in her Akron dissent:
The Court has never required that state regulation that burdens
the abortion decision be 'narrowly drawn' to express only the rele-
vant state interest. In Roe, the Court mentioned 'narrowly drawn'
legislative enactments, but the Court never actually adopted this
standard in the Roe analysis. In its decision today, the Court fully
endorses the Roe requirement that a burdensome health regula-
tion, or as the Court appears to call it, a 'significant obstacle,' be
'reasonably related' to the state compelling interest. The Court
recognizes that '[a] State necessarily must have latitude in adopting
regulations of general applicability in this sensitive area.'
33
This reasonably related test presents less of an obstacle to creat-
ing meaningful abortion regulations than the narrowly tailored test
did. Justice O'Connor's Akron discussion of how the provisions in
that case could be upheld under this alternative test clearly demon-
31 See id. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
32 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
33 Akron, 462 U.S. at 467 n.l 1 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
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strates this point. Thus, the generally accepted second prong of the
"compelling interest" standard of review for abortion cases is now
without force.
II. WEBSTER DOES NOT PORTEND DIRE CONSEQUENCES FOR OTHER
SOCIETAL INTERESTS NOT LOGICALLY CONNECTED TO ABORTION
Claiming that the fundamental abortion right declared in Roe v.
Wade34 cannot fall alone, abortion advocates have raised alarmist
cries that various other rights are inextricably intertwined with the
abortion right and rise or fall with it. These concerns are unfounded
and must be recognized for what they are: an effort to prop up the
moribund analysis of Roe.
A. The Abortion Right Can Fall Alone
The Supreme Court's handiwork in Roe wrought a vast aberra-
tion in every instance where law touches abortion.35 Consequently,
constitutional scholars have criticized Roe intensely,3 6 and have sug-
gested alternative constitutional bases for an abortion right to rem-
edy Roe's fatally flawed substantive due process analysis.37 These
efforts are unpersuasive." With Supreme Court support for the
abortion right eroding, and as the nation moves further from both
the unique historical context which gave rise to Roe and the historical
accident of Supreme Court support for such an opinion,39 abortion
partisans have turned to more emotional, alarmist assertions to gar-
ner support for the abortion right. Three arguments in particular
have been asserted: 1) that the right to contraception is at risk if the
abortion right falls; 2) that civil rights in general are endangered if
the Court rejects the unenumerated abortion right; and 3) that rec-
ognition of the rights the unborn in any fashion will result in unrea-
sonable intrusions into the lives of pregnant women.
34 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
35 See generally Bopp & Coleson, supra note 5 (showing the anomalies of the
special, absolutist rules applied in abortion law as compared to the normal rules
applied in constitutional law, tort law, wrongful death law, criminal law, equity,
medical regulation, and rules of proper adjudication and procedure).
36 See id. at 185-92.
37 See id. at 218-45; Robertson, Gestational Burdens, supra note 4.
38 See Bopp, Will There Be a Constitutional Right to Abortion After the Reconsideration of
Roe v. Wade?, 15J. CONTEMP. L. 131 (1989) (surveying the alternative bases asserted
for a right to abortion and demonstrating the flaws of each).
39 See id. at 173.
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These three arguments employed to shore up eroding support
for a constitutional right to abortion are flawed.
1. Contraception and Abortion are Different
At oral arguments in Webster, Frank Susman, attorney for
Planned Parenthood, argued that abortion is a fundamental right
because it is "deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradition.-
4 0
ChiefJustice Rehnquist responded, "[S]urely abortion was regulated
by the states in the 19th century and in the 20th century?" He con-
tinued, "If you say there is a deeply rooted tradition of freedom in
this area, that suggests that there had been no legislative interven-
tion to me.... [T]hat simply is not the fact."
4 1
This colloquy demonstrates the problem faced by those attempt-
ing to paint abortion as a fundamental right. There simply is no
defensible way to argue that the right to have an abortion is deeply
rooted in our nation's history and tradition. The history of abortion
regulation set forth in the Roe opinion has been thoroughly discred-
ited by subsequent scholarship.4 2
To avoid this problem, Mr. Susman sought at oral argument to
create a new right of procreative choice, which purportedly encom-
passed both the abortion and contraceptive right. This broader right
of procreative choice, Mr. Susman asserted, was the one to be tested
by the history and traditions of our nation and found to be
fundamental.
There are three reasons to reject this effort to take advantage of
the broader constitutional and popular support for contraceptive
rights in order to protect the abortion right. First, abortion and con-
traception are logically and morally separable and, therefore, should
be treated separately.4" Second, a right of procreative choice is over-
40 Transcript of Oral Arguments Before Court on Abortion Case, N.Y. Times, April 27,
1989, at B13, col. 2 [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Arguments]. For a more complete
discussion of the subject in this subsection, see Bopp, The Elusive Abortion Right, THE
NAT'L L.J., June 12, 1989, at 13, col. 1.
41 Transcript of Oral Arguments, supra note 40, at B13, col. 3.
42 See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 5, at 237-40 (authorities cited therein). For
the most current exposition of the history of abortion regulation in English and
American common and statutory law, see Brief Amicus Curiae of the American
Academy of Medical Ethics, Minnesota v. Hodgson, 853 F.2d 1452 (8th Cir. 1988)
(en banc), cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3859 (U.S. July 3, 1989) (No. 88-1309)
(demonstrating that Roe broke with long-established traditions and values of the
common law).
43 For a fuller discussion of this point, including Justice Scalia's response, see
Bopp, supra note 40, at 14.
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broad, encompassing activities beyond contraception and abortion
(e.g., incest and statutory rape) that historically have been left to the
states' police powers for regulation.44 Third, the fundamental rights
test set forth by the Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick45 mandates
that a proposed right be as narrowly defined as possible before being
subjected to the history and tradition test for fundamentality.4" As a
result, the Court must address the narrow right to abortion and not
the broad right of procreative choice.
47
It is untenable to argue that a contraceptive right will fall if the
abortion right falls, because the two are legally and logically distinct.
The Court recognized contraceptive rights eight years before abor-
tion rights existed.48 Even Planned Parenthood explained the differ-
ence in its 1963 pamphlet, Plan Your Children For Health and Happiness,
which declared: "An abortion kills the life of a baby after it has
begun.... Birth control merely postpones the beginning of life."'4 9
Now Planned Parenthood, through Frank Susman, argues that some
substances used to prevent conception (the meaning of the term
"contraception") actually act as abortifacients so that the two are
now inseparable. Justice Scalia, at Webster oral arguments, saw the
fallacy of this merging of two distinct concepts and asked why a court
that can create trimester schemes cannot separate abortion from
contraception.
In fact, in the Court's last term, all nine Justices expressly or
impliedly reaffirmed Griswold v. Connecticut, 5 which extended consti-
tutional protection to contraceptive use. In Webster, the plurality
opinion took great pains to distinguish the analysis and holding of
Griswold, which they approved, from that of Roe, which they disap-
proved.5 1 Justices O'Connor,52 Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall,53 and
44 See id.
45 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
46 See Bopp, supra note 40, at 14.
47 Cf Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (rejecting the abstract formulation of a right to do
what one chooses in one's home in favor of the narrow formulation of a right to
engage in homosexual sodomy); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2343,
2345 (1989) (rejecting justice Brennan's proposed formulation of "the freedom not
to conform" in favor of the more narrow right of "the natural father to assert
parental rights over a child born into a woman's existing marriage with another
man").
48 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
49 PLANNED PARENTHOOD-WORLD POPULATION, PLAN YOUR CHILDREN FOR
HEALTH AND HAPPINESS (1963).
50 381 U.S. 485 (1965).
51 See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3057-58.
52 See id. at 3059 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
53 See id. at 3073 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Stevens5 4 also approved Griswold in Webster. Similarly, in Michael H.
v. Gerald D.,5 5 Justice Scalia, who would have overturned Roe in Web-
ster, 5 6 expressly noted that Griswold was consistent with his mode of
analysis.
57
Thus, contraceptive rights are not inextricably entwined with
abortion rights, and the demise of Roe does not jeopardize true
5 8
contraceptives .-9
2. Civil Rights are Not Threatened.
Likewise, Roe's demise does not jeopardize civil rights, because
using an historical approach to identify ffindamental rights does not
endanger civil rights. The debate over slavery nearly split the Con-
stitutional convention. Moreover, the post-Civil War amendments
explicitly prohibited slavery and racial discrimination.6" Thus, the
Supreme Court had firm constitutional footing when it spoke against
racial discrimination in Brown v. Board of Education.6 1 The Brown
Court not only followed the post-Civil War amendments, but also
"the majestic ... formula: the equal protection of the laws."
6 2
By contrast, there was universal condemnation for abortion
when the framers drafted and adopted the Constitution,6 3 and there
54 See id. at 3081 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
55 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989)
56 See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring).
57 See Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2344 n.6. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy also
expressed approval of Griswold in Michael H. See id. at 2346-47 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part).
58 Even those substances with a primary effect of contraception but a potential
secondary effect of preventing implantation of the fertilized ovum are not in danger
from the demise of Roe. Women taking these drugs to prevent contraception would
lack the intent to induce an abortion that criminal abortion laws require.
Furthermore, in a post-Roe world, Griswold will also protect contraceptives which may
act as abortifacients. Any regulation to prevent the drugs from being used as
abortifacients must be narrowly tailored to effectuate only the state's interest in
protecting unborn life.
59 Some pro-Roe legal scholars have also noted the Court's careful attempts to
distinguish abortion from contraception. See Robertson, The Future of Early Abortion,
supra note 4, at 73, 75.
60 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 68 (1873).
61 347 U.S. 483, 490-91 (1954).
62 Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. LJ. 1, 14
(1971). That Bork should support the Court's opinion in Brown may come as a
surprise to some because alarmist tactics assailed him and painted him as the arch-
nemesis of civil rights. Neither sound principles ofjurisprudence nor the demise of
an illegitimate abortion right threaten the rights of racial minorities, despite
representations to the contrary.
63 See, e.g., Dellapenna, The History of Abortion: Technology, Morality, and Law, 40 U.
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is still no clear national sentiment in favor of abortion. As a result,
the text and history of our Constitution do not support an abortion
right, but the post-Civil War amendments and the Constitution's his-
tory do substantiate racial minorities' right to equal protection.
Therefore, the demise of abortion rights poses no threat to civil
rights in general.
3. Pregnant Women Will Retain Reasonable Liberty Beyond the
Abortion Context.
The final alarm that abortion proponents raise is that the
Supreme Court's approval of the Missouri Preamble64 and the
demise of Roe will restrict pregnant women's liberty. This claim is as
unfounded as the rest.
Abortion advocates see no middle way, only the extremes.
Either every case is decided in favor of the mother or every case is
Prrr. L. REV. 359, 389 & n.195 (1979) (noting that the more populous states had
prohibited abortion by the start of the Civil War); Quay, Justifiable Abortion-Medical
and Legal Foundations, 49 GEO. LJ. 395, 435 (1961) (identifying Connecticut as the
first state to criminalize abortion by statute, in 1821); Witherspoon, Reexamining Roe:
Nineteenth-Century Abortion Statutes and the Fourteenth Amendment, 17 ST. MARY'S LJ. 29,
33 (1985) (noting that thirty of the thirty-seven states had anti-abortion statutes by
the year of the fourteenth amendment).
64 The Missouri preamble reads:
1.205 LIFE BEGINS AT CONCEPTION- UNBORN CHILD DEFINED- FAILURE TO
PROVIDE PRENATAL CARE, NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
1. The General Assembly of this state finds that:
(I) The life of each human being begins at conception;
(2) Unborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and
well-being;
(3) The natural parents of unborn children have protectable
interests in life, health, and well-being of their unborn child.
2. Effective January 1,. 1988, the laws of this state shall be interpreted
and construed to acknowledge on behalf of the unborn child at every
stage of development, all the rights, privileges, and immunities available
to other persons, citizens, and residents of this state, subject only to the
Constitution of the United States, and decisional interpretations thereof
by the United States Supreme Court and specific provisions to the
contrary in the statutes and provisions of this state.
3. As used in this section, the term "UNBORN CHILDREN" or "UNBORN
CHILD" shall include all unborn child or children or the offspring of
human beings from the moment of conception until birth at every stage of
biological development.
4. Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as creating a cause of
action against a woman for indirectly harming her unborn child by failing
to properly care for herself or by failing to follow any particular program
of prenatal care.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1.205 (Vernon 1989).
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resolved in favor of the unborn child. Yet Missouri's Preamble is not
the first recognition of the unborn's rights, and the courts previously
have balanced the rights of both the mother and her child when they
conflict.
Some believe that recognizing the unborn's rights will result in
extreme restrictions on pregnant women's liberty. These people
argue that we are on a slippery slope.6" They view the matter as one
in which the rights of only one party may be considered so that, in
their view, any consideration of fetal rights terminates maternal
rights. They project onto pro-life advocates this same mindset,
claiming that pro-life proponents believe that the unborn child's
rights must always prevail. Such a view, however, is not well-
founded.
B. Protection of Fetal Rights Is Nothing New
Courts have long recognized fetal rights in several areas of the
law, including the criminal, property, tort, wrongful death, and
equity realms, increasingly so with the rise of modern scientific
understanding of prenatal development and the obligation to pre-
vent handicaps for those who will be born.66
65 See, e.g., Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-Ordered
Cesareans, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1951, 1994 (1986) ("[C]ourt ordered cesareans may start
us down that 'slippery slope' toward controlling and coercing pregnant women in the
name of fetal well-being"); Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions and Interventions: What's Wrong
With Fetal Rights, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 45 (1987) (" 'The slippery slope' of the
threats posed by the fetal rights proposals are no longer hypothetical.").
One commentator observes that even though "claims of slippery slope effect will
not necessarily be invalid," they may be "wildly exaggerated." He adds that
"slippery slope claims deserve to be viewed skeptically, and the proponent of such a
claim must be expected to provide the necessary empirical support." Schauer,
Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361, 382 (1985).
66 See, e.g., Bopp & Coleson, supra note 5, at 246-83; Note, The Law and the
Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical Inconsistencies, 46 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 349 (1971)
(examining the right of the unborn in the context of property, torts, equity, criminal,
and abortion law). As many commentators have noted, Roe's declaration that the
unborn have no rights of personhood under the fourteenth amendment has been
given a broad reading which is unwarranted; Roe did not eliminate the rights of the
unborn in other contexts. See Baron, "If You Prick Us, Do We Not Bleed?:" Of Shylock,
Fetuses, and the Concept of Person in the Law, 11 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 52, 56 (1983)
("[T]he law has been largely willing to confer personhood upon the unborn when
solid policy considerations have suggested that course."); Myers, Abuse and Neglect of
the Unborn: Can the State Intervene?, 23 DuQ. L. REV. 1, 15 (1984); Parness & Pritchard,
To Be Or Not to Be: Protecting the Unborn Potentiality of Life, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 257, 258
(1982); Note, Unborn Child: Can You Be Protected?, 22 U. RicH. L. REV. 285, 287 (1988)
(Roe does not necessarily imply that the state may not grant legal recognition to the
unborn in non-fourteenth amendment cases).
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Courts have even required mothers to perform or permit certain
actions for the protection of the unborn and her, own health. With
advances in fetal therapy67 and the increasing recognition of prena-
tal torts, the invocation of courts' equitable powers to protect the
unborn was a logical next step. Moreover, the practice of protecting
the unborn from preventable handicaps antedates Roe and despite
some courts' confusion,68 Roe 69 should not affect it.
67 See, e.g., Lenow, The Fetus as a Patient: Emerging Rights as a Person?, 9 AM.J.L. &
MED. 1, 28 (1983) (stating that "[t]he advent of fetal surgery techniques requires
parents, physicians and the legal system to confront the question of how to
determine the rights of the unborn fetal patient").
68 Some courts have misapplied Roe's viability line and have refused to protect
pre-viable children. In fact, a majority of courts that have intervened have done so
on behalf of the "viable" fetus. One notable exception is Taft v. Taft, 388 Mass. 331,
446 N.E.2d 395 (1983), where the court left open the possibility that "in some
situations ... the State's interest ... might be sufficiently compelling" to order a
pregnant woman to have medical treatment to protect a pre-viable fetus. Id. at 334,
446 N.E.2d at 397. However, with a majority of the Justices on the Supreme Court
recognizing that the states have a compelling interest in unborn life throughout
pregnancy, the viable/pre-viable distinction should be eliminated. If protection of
the unborn was proper under Roe, it is afortiori proper after the demise of Roe.
69 Roe's holding that the unborn are not fourteenth amendment persons is
inapplicable in any other context. See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 5, at 253-61. In
fact, Roe has been used to support intervention on behalf of the unborn where the
mother chooses not to abort because of its recognition of an "important and
legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life" throughout
pregnancy. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162. Roe may, therefore, be viewed as a legitimization of
fetal rights and state authority to protect them. See, e.g., Dougherty, The Right to Begin
Life with Sound Body and Mind: Fetal Patients and Conflicts with Their Mothers, 63 U. DET.
L. REV. 89, 104 (1985) ("[T]he other side of Roe is the establishment of the state's
compelling interest in protecting viable fetal life"); Myers, supra note 66, at 18 ("Roe
makes clear that the state has a substantial authority to protect fetal life"); Note, supra
note 66, at 288 (Roe "legitimized the state's interest in protecting the potential life of
the unborn").
Myers extends the logic of Roe to its inescapable conclusion:
The state's interest in viable fetal life permits it to forbid abortion, an act
designed to extinguish life. It follows from this that the state is
empowered to proscribe other acts calculated or likely to lead to the same
result. Furthermore, since the interest in preservation of fetal life
authorizes intervention to prevent destructive acts, it should also
authorize limited compulsion of action which is necessary to preserve fetal
life. Since a failure to act can as surely lead to frustration of the state's
interest as an affirmative act, the underlying interest must reach both
cases.... Since the state may proscribe acts leading to fetal death, and
may, as a result, require birth, its interest in potential life should extend to
the protection of the quality of life.
Myers, supra note 66, at 18-19 (citations omitted). One commentator has even sug-
gested that as viability is pushed back, "Roe soon may become a 'right-to-life' deci-
sion." Rhoden, The New Neonatal Dilemma: Live Births from Late Abortions, 72 GEO. L.J.
1451, 1454 (1984).
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Several examples demonstrate ways in which the courts have
acted to protect the unborn from harm caused by actions of their
mothers. In Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson,
70
the New Jersey Supreme Court granted an order compelling blood
transfusions, despite the mother's religious convictions, to save her
32-week-old unborn child. The court observed that without the
transfusions "both she [the mother] and the unborn child will die,"
7 1
and held that the unborn child's right to life outweighed the
mother's religious beliefs.72
The courts also have allowed more intrusive procedures like
caesarian sections. In 1981, the Georgia Supreme Court granted an
order compelling a caesarian section over a woman's religious objec-
tions because a vaginal delivery endangered both her life and the
child's.73 In other cases, reported 4 and unreported,75 the trend
toward court ordered caesarian section to protect the unborn from
harm continues.
Finally, courts have also acted to protect the unborn from a class
of maternal actions which will lead to serious fetal damage. The con-
cept of preventing avoidable prenatal injuries has strong support. In
70 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
71 Id. at 423, 201 A.2d at 538.
72 See id. at 424, 201 A.2d at 538; see also Crouse Irving Memorial Hosp., Inc. v.
Paddock, 127 Misc. 2d 101, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (ordering blood
transfusions to save a mother and child over the mother and father's religious
objections); In Re Application of Jamaica Hosp., 128 Misc. 2d 1006, 491 N.Y.S.2d
898 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (ordering blood transfusion to save an 18-week-old fetus
over maternal religious objections).
73 SeeJefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d
457 (1981). The mother in Jefferson had a condition known as complete placenta
previa (blockage of the birth canal by the placenta). Evidence before the court
revealed a vaginal birth would pose a 50% risk of death to the mother and a 99% risk
for the child. Prior to the caesarian section, the condition corrected itself, which is
rare, and the woman delivered normally. See also Lenow, supra note 67, at 21 n.123.
74 See, e.g., In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611, 611 (D.C. 1987), vacated and reh'g en banc
granted, 539 A.2d 203 (D.C. 1988) (holding that a hospital could perform a caesarian
section on a terminally ill woman despite her objections).
75 See, e.g., Jurow & Paul, Cesarean Delivery for Fetal Distress Without Maternal
Consent, 63 OBSTET. & GYN. 596 (1984) (discussing a case where doctors delivered a
fetally distressed infant by cesarian section against the mother's wishes and without a
court order); Kolder, Gallagher & Parsons, Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 316
NEw ENG.J. MED. 1192, 1197 (1987) (noting a national survey counting instances of
court appointed obstetrical procedures in cases of women refusing treatment
necessary to preserve the health of the fetus); Watson & Selgestad, Fetal Versus
Maternal Rights: Medical and Legal Perspectives, 58 AM. J. OBSTET. & GYN. 209, 212
(1981) (discussing In re Unborn Baby Kenner, No. 79JN83 (Col. Juv. Ct., Mar. 6,
1979), where doctors performed a court ordered caesarian section to safeguard an
unborn infant's life in spite of the mother's objections).
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1960, the New Jersey Supreme Court declared "that a child has a
legal right to begin life with a sound mind and body." 76 With the
rapid advance of medical technology, certain prenatal ailments have
become treatable in utero77 and the fetus has become the "second
patient." 78 While some commentators have opposed court protec-
tion of the unborn in such a situation,79 there is a shift in attitudes
which favors balancing fetal rights with the mother's.80 This change
appears even among pro-choice advocates8 1 and, as noted, the
courts have already engaged in such balancing.
This action is appropriate.8 2 It makes no sense that a person
should endure lifetime suffering because her mother cared nothing
for the welfare of her child. The cases clearly show that courts will
regulate activities that pose a substantial risk of significant harm to
the unborn child, provided that the court can reasonably accommo-
date the mother's health, liberty, and bodily integrity interests.
The extreme results predicted by those asserting an absolute
76 Smith v. Brennan, 31 NJ. 353, 364, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (1960).
77 See Harrison, Golbus & Filly, Management of the Fetus With a Correctable
Congenital Defect, 246 J.A.M.A. 774, 776 (1981).
78 WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS Vii (J. Pritchard & P. MacDonald eds. 16th ed. 1980);
See also Kolder, Gallagher & Parsons, supra note 75, at 1194 (noting that gynecologists
and obstetricians take into account the therapeutic interests of the fetus when faced
with a mother who refuses fetal therapy).
79 See, e.g., Gallagher, supra note 65.
80 Compare Fletcher, The Fetus as Patient. Ethical Issues, 246 J.A.M.A. 772, 772
(1981) ("As long as the fetus is not separate from the mother, choices about
treatment ought to be made only with her informed consent.") with Fletcher, Ethical
Considerations in and Beyond Experimental Fetal Therapy, 9 SEMINARS IN PERINATOLOGY
130, 134 (1985) ("If the intervention may serve the future infant [with minimal
maternal intrusion], the refusal of the mother.., should not be a final barrier to
[treatment].").
81 See Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy and
Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405 (1983). Professor Robertson states: "The maternal-
fetal conflicts that arise in managing pregnancy do not involve the woman's right to
procreate, but rather her right to bodily integrity in the course ofprocreating.... Once
she decides to forego abortion and the state chooses to protect the fetus, the woman
loses the liberty to act in ways that would adversely affect the fetus." Id. at 437. See
also the comments of Harvard Law School Professor Alan Dershowitz, disputing his
colleague Lawrence Tribe, in Dershowitz, Pro-choice argument goes too far, Boston
Herald, May 16, 1989, at 27, col. I ("Once a woman has made the decision to bear a
child, the rights of the child should be taken into consideration.... [I]t does not
follow, as a matter of constitutionality, principle of common sense, that a woman has
the right to inflict a lifetime of suffering on her future child, simply in order to satisfy
a momentary whim for a quick fix.").
82 Even John Stuart Mill, that ubiquitous authority in treatises on bioethics and
medico-legal matters, wrote that the maximum individual freedom he championed
should be limited where one's rights collide with the rights of another. See J. MILL,
ON LIBERTY 69-70 (G. Himmelfarb ed. 1985).
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right for the woman83 are not evident in the cases. Stallman v. Young-
quist 84 explodes the myth that the courts will allow either children to
sue their mothers for negligence, or others to sue for miscarriage. In
Stallman, the Illinois Supreme Court held that an unborn child
injured in an automobile accident, but subsequently borne alive,
could not sue her mother.
Thus, although courts will consider the right of a child to be
born with a sound mind and body, they show no indication of disre-
garding the rights and interests of the mother as well. The notion
that recognizing fetal rights portends police raids to remove preg-
nant women from the ski slopes, mandatory genetic testing, or even
forced abortions is not borne out by reality.85
C. How the Balancing May be Improved
Examining the cases demonstrates that to this point, the courts
have engaged in an ad hoc analysis. A rule to guide judicial interven-
tion, however, may be derived.
Because the rights and interests of the mother and child are
inextricably intertwined prior to birth, the analysis considers both
and excludes neither. This principle is foundational in our rule-of-
law regime. One's rights are properly limited where they interfere
with those of another. Abandoning this egalitarian approach would
return us to a class system and grossly undercut our principle of
equal justice under the law.
A balancing approach would protect pregnant women's rights
just as it protects rights in other areas of law. When we prohibit
yelling "Fire!" in a crowded theater, we do not take away the right to
free speech. Rather, we curtail the right because it is outweighed by
rights and interests of others, found to be more weighty in that case.
Therefore, the only equitable approach to considering the rights and
interests of both the mother and her child is to balance them.
The result is a spectrum of instances in which at one end, the
83 See Interview with Laurence Tribe, Morning Edition, National Public Radio,
July 14, 1989, quoted in Do PREGNANT WOMEN LOSE LEGAL RIGHTS?, CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY'S EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS 44 (July 28, 1989) (positing that women
might be punished for athletic activity).
84 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988).
85 See Do PREGNANT WOMEN LOSE LEGAL RIGHTS?, supra note 83, at 422-24
(quoting certain persons positing these two extremes as legitimate risks of
recognizing fetal rights).
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interests of the mother outweigh those of the unborn child, and at
the other, the unborn child must be protected. 6
A two-pronged analysis is appropriate for determining when
and how the court should act when a conflict of rights occurs.
8 7
The first prong of the test may be stated thus: The court may
act if the pregnant woman is engaging in knowing and intentional
behavior which poses a substantial risk of significant harm to her
unborn child, provided that the woman's liberty, health, and bodily
integrity interests may reasonably be accommodated.
The purpose of this first prong is twofold. First, the court must
examine the risk of harm to the unborn child to determine whether
protective action is warranted. Second, if the risk of harm is serious
enough to warrant protection, then the court must determine
whether this protection can be achieved with a reasonable accommo-
dation of the mother's interests in liberty, bodily integrity, and
health. If both cannot be met, a court should not act.
The risk of harm is determined by considering both the substan-
tiality of the risk and the significance of the harm. Where either is
very low, there will be a low risk of harm.
For example, activities such as jaywalking pose a risk of signifi-
cant harm to the unborn child, but the risk itself is slight. Therefore,
a court should not intervene. At the other end of the spectrum
would be activities such as chronic and severe substance abuse, pos-
ing near-certain risk of significant harm.88 In such situations, a court
86 As a preliminary matter, a court's jurisdiction over the mother and her
unborn child must attach from some source. For example, a state statute prohibiting
child abuse, or probation from a pre-existing criminal conviction could provide the
basis for the court's power over the mother. Further, the state's power could only be
properly exercised after proving the facts to be used in balancing these rights in a
particular case, pursuant to proper procedures.
87 The following test assumes a high degree of medical certainty and efficacy for
any proposed procedure when medical treatment is sought against the mother's will.
There are also other additional considerations:
State intervention to protect fetal health should be considered only when
(1) there is a high likelihood of serious fetal disease, (2) there is a high
level of diagnostic and prognostic accuracy, (3) there is strong scientific
evidence that the proposed treatment is efficacious, (4) deferring
intervention until after birth could cause significant further damage, (5)
the risk to the mother is minimal, (6) interference with maternal privacy is
not egregious, and (7) attempts at persuasion, education, and obtaining
informed consent have been exhausted.
Landwirth, Fetal Abuse and Neglect: An Emerging Controversy, 79 PEDIATRICS 508, 513
(1987).
88 Where the well-being of the mother is also at risk, the state has an additional
interest at stake, especially if the harmful activity is criminal.
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may act provided that it may make a reasonable accommodation of
the mother's interests.
A reasonable accommodation of the mother's interests must
consider the risk to the child together with the risk to and intrusive-
ness upon the mother that the protective procedure or action
requires. A court will determine the degree of risk to and intrusive-
ness upon the mother by considering the risk to the mother's health,
the physical discomfort and intrusiveness of any procedure, and the
limitation on her liberty. Where there is a very high risk of harm to
or intrusiveness upon the mother, no risk of harm to the child would
justify state protective action for the child. Such would be the case
where the mother's life is at risk from the protective action. Where
the risk of harm to or intrusiveness upon the mother is low and the
risk of harm to the child is high, however, protective action would be
appropriate.
Where the state is justified in acting, it should act within the
guidelines of the second prong of the test: in acting, the state must
utilize the least restrictive means necessary to protect the life and
health of the unborn.
Because the purpose of enforcement is protective, not punitive,
ex post facto penalties would have little value. By the time penalties
could be imposed, the damage to the unborn would already have
been done. For example, the threat of additional penalties will not
deter a woman who is already abusing drugs and engaging in other
illegal activity to support her habit, and they will not protect her
unborn child.
Further, court fashioned remedies protecting unborn life should
be the most minimally intrusive possible. If periodic testing and
counseling for substance abuse, in the context of probation for prior
abuse, would be effective, then incarceration should be avoided.
Other "least restrictive" means of furthering the state's interest in
protecting the unborn from harm might include required warnings
on alcoholic beverages and public education campaigns about the
dangers drugs and alcohol pose to unborn children.
In the end, though, there is no logical or legal reason why a state
may not go beyond public education measures to prevent activities
which impose substantial risk of significant harm on the unborn.
The state, however, must do so in a way that honors the interest of
the woman in liberty, health, and bodily integrity.
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CONCLUSION
Webster has wrought a substantial de facto change in abortion law
and forecasts an express, formal reconsideration and overruling of
Roe. This change is wholly salutary, bringing abortion law into
greater conformity with the rest of the law by recognizing the rights
of the unborn as well as those of women. Moreover, Webster does not
threaten civil or contraceptive rights.
Further, Webster will not place unreasonable burdens on
women's rights. Courts, before and after Roe, have acted to protect
the unborn's life and health when reasonable accommodation of the
pregnant woman's health, bodily integrity, and liberty interest was
possible. Done properly, such orders impose no burden on any
woman that is not justified by the fact that her unborn child's destiny
is inextricably intertwined with her own.

